Civic culture in east and west by Janmaat, J.G.
VU Research Portal
Civic culture in east and west
Janmaat, J.G.
published in
European Journal of Sociology / Archives Europeennes de Sociologie
2006
DOI (link to publisher)
10.1017/s0003975606000129
document version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in VU Research Portal
citation for published version (APA)
Janmaat, J. G. (2006). Civic culture in east and west. European Journal of Sociology / Archives Europeennes de
Sociologie, 47(3), 363-393. https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003975606000129
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
E-mail address:
vuresearchportal.ub@vu.nl
Download date: 22. May. 2021
               
Civic Culture in Western
and Eastern Europe *
A              in the social sciences is that civic tradi-
tions are more salient in Western Europe than in Central and Eastern
Europe. Among the scholars who subscribe to this view, there are many
who have located the origin of the difference in the pre-modern past.
Typically they see the appearance of autonomous cities in many parts of
Western Europe in the late Middle Ages as the key factor (Bloch ;
Chirot ). These cities prevented the Monarchy, the Nobility and the
Church from exerting a stifling absolute rule and provided shelter for a
growing class of entrepreneurs, merchants, craftsmen and clerks, who
through their various forms of association and cooperation, in which
they participated as equals, developed the attitudinal and behavioural
patterns associated with civic culture. By contrast, Central and Eastern
Europe, it is argued, lack a history of strong independent cities, and
therefore the classes seen as supporting civic culture could not mature
there to a sufficient degree. The rise of the absolutist state in this region
(Russia, Prussia and Austria) actually exacerbated social inequalities as
the aristocracy imposed ever more restrictions and duties on the peasant
serfs to compensate for the imposition of central taxes needed for the
institution of a permanent army (Anderson ). Only by brutally
suppressing the occasional peasant revolts could the militarized states of
the East maintain a fragile and stagnant social order. Under these feudal,
violent and hierarchical conditions, which lasted up to the (late) arrival
of modernization, civic culture could not flourish. Neither could
modernization bring about a change of values as its specific brand in
Central and Eastern Europe was too top-down, too artificial or too much
imposed by foreign forces to be able to cultivate the civic-democratic
patterns of Western Europe. Barrington Moore (), for instance,
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argues that the involvement of the aristocracy and the state in the indus-
trialization of Germany and Japan proved fatal for the development of
democracy in these countries. Instead of national identities based on
civic-democratic principles, Eastern nations developed allegiances
based on kinship, race, language and folk history, so the story goes.
A well-known historian concurring in this version of events is Hans
Kohn (, ). He added a normative and thus provocative
dimension to the civic-West/ethnic-East framework by contending that
civic identities are conducive to democracy, tolerance and freedom while
ethnic thinking is the necessary companion of authoritarianism, oppres-
sion and xenophobia. Unsurprisingly, it is precisely this normative ele-
ment (civic = ‘‘good’; ethnic = ‘‘bad’’) that has inspired a heated debate in
the study of nationalism in recent years. Scholars have attacked the
framework on historical grounds by arguing that Western nations, like
Eastern ones, have ethnic roots (Smith ) and have pursued exclusio-
nary policies towards ethnic others in the past (Kuzio ). Theoreti-
cally, the dichotomy has been criticized for employing categories (ethnic,
civic) that collapse too many unrelated notions (Kymlicka a), and
for failing to note that nations defining themselves in civic terms, such as
the Latin American countries, need not always have strong democratic
traditions (Nielsen ). Lastly, academics have questioned its empi-
rical validity by observing that the variation within the West and within
the East is larger than that between the regions in terms of how people
understand their national identities (Shulman ). Given the pro-
found criticism the framework has attracted, and notably the Hans Kohn
variety, it has few supporters today in the field of nationalism.
Remarkably, in their analyses of the Kohn dichotomy students of
nationalism have only assessed whether national identities are conceived
in civic or ethnic terms, not the substance of civic culture itself. In other
words they have not explored whether the citizenries of the West and the
East differ in levels of social trust, participation in non-state organiza-
tions and public spiritedness, elements which are usually associated with
civic culture. This theme has been the exclusive domain of social capital
theory, a strand of research that has rapidly developed after the publi-
cation of Robert Putnam’s influential work Making Democracy Work:
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (). In this book Putnam argues that
the presence of civic culture in the northern part of Italy and its absence
in the South is the key explanation for the differential rate of success of
regional government in the country. In tracing the roots of civic culture,
he closely follows the historical argument outlined above: in the free
cities of the North civic associations of equals based on trust, norms of

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reciprocity and perceptions of the common good thrived, while the
sophisticated authoritarian state apparatus left behind by the powerful
Norman king, Frederick II, in the thirteenth century precluded similar
processes from occurring in the South. By locating the origins of civic
culture in the Middle Ages and by seeing it as the single most important
factor shaping the performance of political institutions, Putnam accords
a great amount of stability, solidity and explanatory power to civic cul-
ture. Although in later works he concedes that civic culture in its turn is
affected by economic, political and technological developments (Putnam
; Putnam and Goss ), the emphasis is clearly on the reverse
relationship in Making Democracy Work. On top of that, Putnam consi-
ders civic culture to embody a distinct set of interrelated attitudes.
People in a civic community, he writes, ‘‘on most accounts, are more than
merely active, public-spirited, and equal. Virtuous citizens are helpful,
respectful, and trustful toward one another’’ (, p. ). The idea of
civic culture as a coherent syndrome of dispositions is expressed even
clearer in Bowling Alone:
People who trust their fellow citizens volunteer more often, contribute more rea-
dily to charity, participate more often in politics and community organizations,
serve more readily in juries, give blood more frequently, comply more fully with
their tax obligations, are more tolerant of minority views, and display many other
forms of civic virtue. (Putnam , p. )
According to Jackman and Miller (), Putnam is certainly not alone
in assuming civic culture to be a coherent and durable phenomenon that
is relatively impervious to political and economic events. These assump-
tions, in their view, are characteristic of culture theorists in general, i.e. of
those scholars who hold culture to be the key factor shaping societal
trends, whether it is Weber (Protestantism), Banfield (amoral familism)
or Huntingdon (civilizations primarly based on religion).
In this paper I focus on these crucial assumptions. I will examine the
coherence and durability of civic culture by analyzing the nature of civic
culture and the strength of civic attitudes in East and West. I rely on
data from the ,  and  editions of the World Values Survey
(WVS) and on the  edition of the European Values Study to explore
these issues. The first section of the paper discusses the various
approaches to civic culture, the relation of the concept to the more
commonly used notion of social capital, and the coherence of civic cul-
ture at both the individual and societal level. Subsequently, the paper
compares the nature of civic culture in western countries and transition
states. The last section introduces three perspectives on civic culture:
the historical roots idea outlined above, a perspective stressing the legacy
 
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of communism, and a theory on the effects of post-communist transi-
tion. Each of these perspectives accords a different degree of malleabi-
lity to civic culture and predicts a slightly different pattern of civic
values across and within East and West. By comparing the explanatory
value of these perspectives, I will arrive at conclusions about the solidity
of civic culture in general.
The relevance of examining the consistency and durability of civic
culture is obvious as the phenomenon is often seen as a precondition for
democracy and the rule of law (see discussion below). If civic culture is
indeed crucial for democracy and it is as one-dimensional and resistant
to change as cultural theorists contend, then all attempts to introduce
democracy in non-civic environments (e.g. the Anglo-American efforts
in Iraq) would appear to be a waste of time and energy. The results of
this study, however, give the missionaries of democracy some grounds
for optimism. Neither at the individual nor at the societal level does civic
culture appear to be a cohesive one-dimensional syndrome. Only some
aspects of civic culture seem to be quite durable, given that their cross-
country patterns are reasonably well explained by the historical pers-
pective. Most aspects would appear to be quite changeable since their
distributions are more in line with the two perspectives that see civic
culture as a more pliable phenomenon. These findings imply that ‘‘civic
culture’’ needs to be understood as no more than an umbrella term
embracing a collection of highly diverse values which are more pliable
than is often thought. This suggests that socio-economic and political
transformations do have the potential to bring about a desired change in
values, also in traditionally ‘‘uncivic’’ environments.
Civic Culture and Social Capital
How has academia understood and evaluated civic culture? A review
of the literature reveals, first of all, that the term is subject to much
confusion as there seem to be as many definitions of civic culture as there
are scholars writing about the subject. These definitions are partly
overlapping and partly diverging. All of them for instance stress attitu-
des such as public spiritedness, participation and tolerance but only
some include critical engagement (Kymlicka , ) or certain
economic virtues (Galston ). Moreover, although essentially refer-
ring to the same phenomenon, each scholar employs his or her own
distinctive labels. Thus, whereas Almond and Verba () indeed speak
of ‘‘civic culture’’, Putnam () uses ‘‘civic community’’, and

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Kymlicka () and Galston () speak of ‘‘civic virtues’’ and ‘‘libe-
ral virtues’’, respectively.
These differences, however, hide one important similarity. In an echo
of Kohn, all four scholars see civic culture as a sine qua non for demo-
cracy. In other words, even with all the institutional arrangements in
place, a democracy will not function effectively and will not be sustain-
able in the long run if it is not supported by an active and engaged citi-
zenry. As Kymlicka (b, ) explains, this has become pains-
takingly clear from events in the post-colonial world, where political
elites have abused the state apparatus to favour their own ethnic group or
class at the expense of others. In order to prevent irresponsible elites
from hijacking the state, a democracy, he argues, needs a citizenry that
critically scrutinizes policy, holds politicians accountable, and actively
engages in public affairs through reasoned and civilized deliberation.
Theseforhimarethecorecivicvirtuesonwhichdemocracyrests.Though
having a broader understanding of civic culture than Kymlicka, Almond
andVerba, as thepioneers in thisfieldof study,wouldalsosubscribe to the
view that democracy is upheld by politically engaged citizens. They see
civic culture as an all-inclusive phenomenon comprising ‘‘participant’’
attitudes in addition to the more traditional ‘‘parochial’’ and ‘‘subject’’
orientations, yet hold only participant attitudes to be distinctive of demo-
cracies: ‘‘In general, a parochial, subject, or participant culture would be
most congruent with, respectively, a traditional political structure, a cen-
tralized authoritarian structure and a democratic political structure’’
(Almond and Verba , p. ). Espousing a similarly broad view of
civic culture, Galston clusters a variety of social, economic and political
virtues under the label ‘‘liberal virtues’’ and argues that a majority of
citizens must have these qualities for democracy to perform well:
When I speak of certain virtues as instrumental to the preservation of liberal
communities, I mean not that every citizen must possess these virtues but, rather,
that most citizens must. The broad hypothesis is that as the proportion of non-
virtuous citizens increases significantly, the ability of liberal societies to function
successfully progressively diminishes (Galston , p. ).
The vast literature on social capital has likewise mainly focused on
the link between social networks, as the core component of social capital,
and democracy. Central to the debate has been the question whether
high levels of civic associations and activity are always conducive to
social trust and democracy. Critics of social capital theory have argued
that organizations based on ethnic, religious or other cultural commo-
nalities, particularly in culturally diverse societies, could well reinforce
existing divisions, promote distrust between communities and therefore
 
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complicate democratic government (Portess and Landholt ; Dowley
and Silver; Norris; Green, Preston and Sabates). Advoca-
tes of the theory have responded that a distinction needs to be made
between bonding (exclusive) and bridging (inclusive) forms of association.
Bonding networks are good for ‘‘thick’’ interpersonal trust, solidarity and
psychological security, but they need to be complemented by bridging
networks which, though based on weak ties, help individuals in getting
access to new information and expanding their horizons. It is the bridging
rather than the bonding forms of social capital that hold society together
(De Souza Briggs ; Putnam ; Putnam and Goss ).
The preoccupation of social capital theory with democracy and social
cohesion seems to have diverted attention away from issues of coherence
and conceptual clarity. How does social capital for instance relate to civic
culture? While some authors use the terms interchangeably, others,
Putnam included, seem to regard social capital as a specific subset or
core component of the values associated with civic culture. Defining
social capital as ‘‘features of social organization, such as trust, norms [of
reciprocity, JGJ] and networks, that can improve the efficiency of
society by facilitating coordinated actions’’ (Putnam , p. ), he
sees the phenomenon as capable of not only reproducing itself, but also
of engendering the other characteristics of the civic community. Perhaps
because social capital in most accounts is a more parsimonious concept
than civic culture, it has largely replaced the latter in cultural theory and
political science. Yet, given the widely diverging definitions of civic
culture and Putnam’s insistence on seeing it as a coherent syndrome of
attitudes (see above), it is surprising that the concept of civic culture has
not drawn more attention from the academic community.
Interestingly, Putnam () himself did explore the internal consis-
tency of the concept. Using aggregate data at the regional level, he discov-
ered a one-dimensional syndrome of the ‘‘civic community’’ consisting of
preferencevoting,referendumturnout,newspaperreadershipanddensity
of sports and cultural associations, but, as Jackman and Miller ()
rightly point out, this construct captures only aggregates of behavioural
indicesanddoesnot includeattitudes,valuesanddispositions.Inresponse
to this criticism, Brehm and Rahn () have shown that a social capital
syndromecomprisingbothabehaviouralindicator(civicassociations)and
an attitude (interpersonal trust) does exist at the individual level. Their
analysis, however, does not cover the many other notions associated with
civic culture and is only based on data from the United States (the
General Social Survey). It is quite feasible that different patterns emerge
in other countries. Moreover, they have not explored the conceptual

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boundaries of their construct. We thus do not know to what extent it can
be separated from concepts in the semantic vicinity.
Related to the issue of coherence is the question on which level civic
culture is operating and how it compares in this regard to social capital.
Scholars are not in agreement regarding the nature of the latter. On the
onehandtherearethosewhoviewsocialcapitalasaprivategoodwhichcan
be mobilised by individuals to accumulate wealth and status (Bourdieu




with high levels of social capital automatically benefit from this situation
irrespective of their contribution to the phenomenon (Van Deth ).
They also hold social capital to be self-perpetuating and reinforcing. In
other words, individuals cannot be excluded from the consumption of
social capital, but this is not problematic since consumption increases
rather than decreases overall stocks of social capital. Remarkably,
though seeing social capital as a public good, Putnam argues that its
components also cluster at the individual level:
Our discussion of trends in social connectedness and civic engagement has tacitly
assumed that all the forms of social capital that we have discussed are themselves
coherently correlated across individuals. This is in fact true. Members of asso-
ciations are much more likely than non-members to participate in politics, to
spend time with neighbors, to express social trust and so on. (quoted in Badescu
and Uslaner , p. )
Likewise, as illustrated by the quotation above, he considers indivi-
duals in the ‘‘civic community’’ to display a range of civic virtues
simultaneously. Thus, in Putnam’s philosophy, there should at least be a
coherent syndrome of civic culture at the individual level. On top of
that, social capital, as the set of core characteristics of civic culture,
should constitute a one-dimensional phenomenon at both the individual
and the societal level. The idea of social capital as a distinct societal
phenomenon has, however, been questioned by Green, Preston and
Janmaat (). They argue that contextual factors operating at the
societal level may have such a large impact on trust and association as the
core characteristics of social capital that in their aggregate these cha-
racteristics are no longer interrelated. To illustrate their argument they
note that the Nordic countries combine high levels of trust with mode-
rate levels of associations while the reverse applies in the USA. In the
following I explore to what extent survey data support the idea of a




The problem of conceptual coherence and the public or private nature
of civicculturehaveobviousrelevanceforthispaperascivicculturemaybe
understoodindifferentwaysacrosstheEastandtheWest.Iwillturntothis
issue in the next section. First I assess to what extent the elements of civic
cultureclusteratboththe individualandthesocietal levelusingthepooled
dataof EasternandWesterncountries(I labelledcountrieswithacommu-
nist past as ‘‘Eastern’’ and all others as ‘‘Western’’) (). To begin with the
individual level,whenwouldcivicculture,statisticallyspeaking,beaccep-
ted as an internally homogenous and externally distinctive concept? It
wouldbeacceptedassuchif thenotions it includesmeet twoconditions:)
the correlations amongst them are stronger than those between them and
concepts not associated with civic culture; ) these correlations are in the
expected direction. To take an example, the civic culture elements of
participation and social trust should be more closely related to one ano-
ther than either of the two with, say, baldheadedness at age , and this
correlation should be positive ¢ i.e. those participating should be more
trusting than those not participating.
I employed the set of characteristics Putnam (, pp. -)
ascribes to the civic community to identify indicators of civic culture in
the WVS and EVS data bases (see Table ). The table also states how
these indicators will be referred to in the following. Subsequently, I
correlated the civic culture items with each other and with items not
associated with civic culture ¢ level of education, feeling of happiness,
state of health, importance of work vs. leisure (see Table ) (). To be
() I use the unweighted data, which means
thateachnationhasanequalweightinthepooled
data set. The data set consists of  countries in
total.TheEastisrepresentedbyEstonia,Latvia,
Lithuania, Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, Moldova,
Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Poland, The
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania,
Bulgaria, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia,
Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania. The
West isrepresentedbyCanada,USA,Australia,
Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Ireland, Ice-
land,Norway,Sweden,Finland,Denmark,The
Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, France,
Luxemburg, Switzerland, Austria, Portugal,
Spain,Italy,MaltaandGreece.
() The scales of a number of items have
been reversed to ensure that a positive correla-
tion between two civic items always denotes a
relationship in the expected direction. The
answers to the civic items have been interpreted
inthefollowingway:
discuss politics with friends: the more often
¢ themorecivic;
signing a petition: have done ¢ the more
civic;
jobs scarce priority men: disagree ¢ the
morecivic;




proportion of compatriots claiming state
benefits: the less mentioned ¢ the more
civic;
immigrants and foreign workers unwanted
as neighbours: not mentioned ¢ the more
civic;
homosexuals unwanted as neighbours: not
mentioned¢ themorecivic;
number of different organizations, belong-
ingto: thehigher thenumber¢ themorecivic;
number of different organizations, doing
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. Discuss political matters with friends (frequently,
occasionally or never)











. When jobs are scarce, men should have more right
to a job than women (agree, neither, disagree)
. When jobs are scarce, employers should give
priority to [OWN NATIONALITY] over immi-









Would you be prepared to actually do something to
improve the conditions of...
. the elderly in your country?
( absolutely yes —  absolutely no)
. the sick and disabled in your country? ( absolu-












. Most people can be trusted / can’t be too careful
. How many compatriots claim state benefits to















Which people would you not like to have as neigh-
bors?
. Immigrants/foreign workers












. Number of different organizations respondent
belongs to*
. Number of different organizations respondent









* The WVS asked respondents whether they belonged to and did voluntary work for the fol-
lowing types of organizations: social welfare for elderly, handicapped or deprived people; religious
or church organizations; education, arts, music or cultural activities; labor unions; political parties
or groups; local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality;
third world development or human rights; conservation, environment, animal rights groups;
professional associations; youth work; sports or recreation; women’s groups; peace movement;
voluntary organizations concerned with health; other groups. It needs to be underlined that this
measure only asked respondents whether they belonged to one or more organizations of each


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































sure, these non-civic items are likely to show a link with the civic culture
items (notably education), but if these links are stronger than the rela-
tions among the civic culture items themselves, the conceptual cohe-
rence of civic culture is undermined. The results of Table  support the
idea of a coherent syndrome of civic culture at the individual level only
to a certain degree. The good news for civic culture theorists is that the
correlations amongst the indicators of civic culture are nearly all in the
expected direction (only  out of  correlations do not conform to the
expected pattern). The bad news, however, is that the correlations
amongst the civic culture items are not stronger than those between the
civic and the non-civic items (while  out of  civic-X-civic correla-
tions are larger than ., roughly the same proportion ( out of )
applies to the civic-X-noncivic correlations which are larger than .).
The overall level of correlations, moreover, is low with many correlations
not exceeding the value of .. The vast majority of the correlations are
significant but this is only because of the high number of respondents
(N> , for all correlations). In sum, the data for all countries com-
bined do support Putnam’s claim that more politically engaged indivi-
duals are also more trusting, helpful, tolerant etc, but the links between
these civic virtues are not very strong and many are as closely linked to
notions not associated with civic culture. There is thus no evidence of a
clearly demarcated syndrome of civic culture at the individual level. One
could equally well cluster the items of Table  completely differently
and argue that a certain group combining civic and non-civic items
represents the syndrome of, say, ‘‘positive outlook on life’’.
Let us now see if a more convincing syndrome of civic culture can be
found at the societal level. I used national aggregates of the WVS/EVS
items to explore this issue (). It turns out that the pattern of correla-
tions at the societal level differs in two ways from that found at the
individual level (see Table  for the correlations between national
aggregates). First, there are more cases of unexpected relations between
civic culture items. Notably the items political discussions and civic
() Obviously, the national level is only one
of the collective levels at which civic culture
could operate. Putnam for instance observed
varying levels of civic traditions across regions
within Italy. It must therefore be acknowledged
that country aggregate data can hide important
internal differences. Another matter is whether
aggregate data can be used at all to measure a
phenomenon at the societal level. According to
Van Deth (), the cross-correlation of
aggregate data only reproduces relationships
found at the micro-level. Aggregate data would
thus not be an appropriate tool to study
macro-level phenomena. I disagree. Theoreti-
cally, it is possible that a relationship at the
macro-level between aggregates of individual
characteristics is not manifested at the micro-
level. It is for instance feasible that overall
levels of civic values are high in a country
while individuals in this country vary in the











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































honesty are correlated negatively with several other items, although these
correlations are not significant. Second, the correlations between the
civic items are much stronger with  out of  binary correlations
having values that exceed .. This difference, however, is obviously
related to the number of units on which the analysis was performed as
the N in the correlations of aggregates is only a fraction of that in the
correlations of individual level data. Indeed, as was the case at the
individual level, the civic indices are as strongly correlated to the non-
civic items as to each other.
To probe the data further and explore underlying dimensions, I
performed a principle component analysis on both levels of data (see
Table ). The results of these analyses confirm that correlations
between aggregates are stronger than those between individual level
items. Whereas the (varimax-rotated) solution for the individual level
finds as much as five dimensions which together explain a mere .% of
the variance, the three dimensions extracted at the aggregate level
account for no less than .% of the variance. Moreover, while each of
the dimensions at the individual level is clustering items that refer to one
component of civic culture only, the societal dimensions unite items
which belong to different components. The first societal dimension, for
instance, combines the items referring to political equality, trust and
tolerance with passive participation (factor loadings of . and more), and
explains an impressive .% of the variance even in a rotated solution.
By contrast, the first dimension at the individual level only groups the
two items representing solidarity and accounts for just .% of the
variance. Yet, and most importantly, there is not a single dimension
capturing all or almost all of the components of civic culture at either of
the two levels. Even at the macro-level, the first dimension faces strong
competition from the second dimension which groups four civic items
and collects almost as much of the explained variance as the first
dimension (.%). Moreover, both these dimensions are ‘‘polluted’’ by
a non-civic item which also shows a high loading on the extracted fac-
tors. In short, neither at the individual nor at the societal level can a
convincing syndrome of civic culture be found, i.e. a syndrome that is
internally homogenous and externally distinctive. Interestingly, even the
elements of the more restricted concept of social capital do not neatly
group in one dimension at the societal level (active participation is the
dissident as it loads on the second dimension). This means that the idea
of social capital as a distinct phenomenon with the characteristics of a
public good is not fully supported either.
 
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Principal Components Analysis of civic attitudes
in  eastern and western countries (varimax rotation)
Variables Individual level Aggregate level





. . -. -. . . -. .
Political
activity
. . . . . . . -.
Gender
equality
. -. . -. . . . .
Ethnic equality . . . -. . . . .
Helping elderly . . . . -. -. . -.
Helping sick &
disabled
. . . . -. -. . -.
Social
trust
-. . . . . . . .
Civic
honesty
-. . . -. -. . -. .
Ethnic
tolerance
. -. . . -. . -. -.
Sexual
tolerance
. . . . -. . -. -.
Passive
participation
. . . . . . . .
Active
participation
. . -. . . . . .
Other indices Education -. . -. . . -. -. .
Feeling
happy
. . . . -. . . -.
Leisure
important
-. . -. .  . . -.
Eigen-value . . . . . . . .
% of explained
variance
. . . . . . . .
N , 
NB: Loadings of . and more are given in bold.


The Nature of Civic Culture in East and West
As noted before, issues of conceptual coherence and level of analysis
have an obvious relevance for the topic of this paper as the nature of
civic culture may differ across geographical contexts. Rose, Mishler and
Haerpfer () for instance have argued that civic cooperation takes a
completely different form in the postcommunist countries in compari-
son to the West. In the former, informal social networks with minimal
links to the state predominate. This has been the legacy, the authors
contend, of decades of totalitarian rule in which the relations between
the state and the citizen were characterized by oppression, dependency
and arbitrariness. Under these conditions, citizens developed a profound
distrust in the state and in institutions under its control. Contacts with
the state and formal institutions were minimized for fear of unexpected
persecution, and if contacts were unavoidable the prevailing attitude was
one of exploiting the state before it exploits you. The result of all this,
Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer explain, has been the appearance in com-
munist times of an hourglass society, composed of a mass of citizens
minding their own business at the bottom, economic and political elites
vying for power and wealth at the top, and a ‘‘missing middle’’ of mini-
mal connections between these two groups (ibid., p. ). Given these
circumstances, it is no surprise that independent civic organizations,
when they were finally permitted to exist alongside official institutions
towards the end of the s, quickly defined themselves in opposition to
the state and the Communist Party (Smolar ). In the civic demo-
cracies of the West, by contrast, the individual is connected to the state
through a network of informal and formal civic associations that nego-
tiate with the state rather than blindly oppose it. Summing up, in the
transition states there is a sharp rift between the private and the public,
between the informal and the formal, while these domains are closely
interwoven in the West.
Communist rule, however, has not only isolated individuals from the
state but also from each other. In a society where the state makes use of
informers to spy on its citizens, you ‘‘really cannot be too careful in
dealing with other people’’ as Uslaner (, p. ) explains. The result,
he notes, has been that people distrust strangers and will only share their
innermost thoughts and political convictions with family and close
friends. Networks of acquaintances and friends therefore tend to be
much smaller, though perhaps at the same time much more intense and
focused, than in the West. In a similar vein, Schoepflin (, p. ) has
 

argued that the authoritarian nature of communism not only
strengthened vertical links of dependency but also undermined hori-
zontal bonds of solidarity:
The hyperétatism of communism predictably produced [...] forms of dependence
and individuation in which interpersonal connections and interactions, other than
those within the family and with very close friends, were laden with suspicion,
distrust and a zero-sum game mentality, to create an atomized society.
In this environment, he contends, ethnic loyalties prevailed as they
were the only bonds people could rely upon to counter feelings of alie-
nation and atomisation.
Because of the alleged different nature of citizen-state and inter-
citizen relationships, social capital in the transition countries has mainly
been understood and examined as a micro-level phenomenon reflecting
informal social networks (Mateju ). Indeed, describing the coping
strategies of three entrepreneurs in Hungary, Swain () argues that
the Bourdieu approach to social capital, which defines the concept as
‘‘contacts with influential people’’ and therefore sees it as the property of
an individual, is better equipped to analyse social relations in post-
communist countries than the public good type of social capital advo-
cated by Putnam. If civic relations in the East are as different as is
claimed, what syndrome, or non-syndrome, of civic culture can we
expect to find at the individual level using the indicators introduced in
the previous section? As most of the indicators refer to citizen-state
relations (political activity; civic honesty; passive and active participa-
tion () ¢ see once again Table ), to relations with the anonymous other
(social trust), and to relations with people with different lifestyles or
different ethnic backgrounds (sexual tolerance; ethnic tolerance), we
would expect levels of civic attitudes to be low across most indicators.
This would have the effect of mitigating the correlations between them
to the point they would no longer be significant or show a reversed sign.
Among the remaining indicators, political discussions is the only one that
seems to represent the informal social capital held to be so typical of the
East. As it is not so much interest in politics per se as the way in which
this interest is expressed, on which the regions are seen to differ, levels of
political discussions are expected to be at least as high in the East in
comparison to the West. The variation this produces on the indicator
should be reflected in the correlations of this indicator with the other
indicators of civic culture, which are likely to be of a higher magnitude.
() Passive and active participation in civic
associations have a link to the state in a sense




Let us see if the data confirm these conjectures. Table  presents the
correlations between the civic culture items for the two regions separa-
tely. It appears that the correlations are indeed weaker in the transition
countries. Out of  correlations in total  correlations in the West and
 in the East have values of . or more. Seven correlations in the West
and  in the East are not significant at the. level or show a reversed
sign. Moreover, while in the West these seven correlations are confined
to the two items representing solidarity, in the East the  correlations
affect many more components of civic culture. Remarkably though, it is
political activity, passive participation and the two solidarity indicators
that show the highest correlations with other civic items in the East, not
political discussions as we might have expected. What is more, the inter-
regional differences are not dramatic. In both regions the vast majority
of correlations are in the expected direction ¢ in fact in only two cases in
the West and five cases in the East is the sign reversed. Thus, civic values
form an even weaker complex at the micro-level in the East as compared
to the West, but this syndrome does not seem to be radically different.
However, to fully explore the ‘‘bad effects of communism’’ argument,
the levels of civic culture in the two regions have to be examined, which
is what the next section does.
Levels of civic culture in East and West
This study is decidedly not the first to examine differences in civic
culture in East and West. In recent years many studies have explored
levels of civicness in the two regions and their relation to political and
economic processes. Raiser et alii () for instance found levels of
social capital (interpersonal trust and civic participation) to be signifi-
cantly lower in the East. Interestingly, they show that trust is not related
to economic growth in the transition countries while it is positively
correlated with growth in the OECD countries. Civic participation, on
the other hand, is correlated with economic performance in both regions,
a relation Raiser et alii (ibidem) attribute to the ability of civic organiza-
tions to facilitate information exchange, reduce the cost of enforcement
and offer interest groups the opportunity to participate in the political
process. Using data from the mid-s, they also observe that social
capital, in its turn, is negatively affected by income inequality, leading
them to suggest that redistributive policies could be an effective way of






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































capital and democratization, Dowley and Silver () found no correla-






democracy among the titular group, the reverse relationship applied for
membersof ethnicminorities, i.e. themoreactivememberswere less trus-
ting of democratic institutions than the more passive ones. In ethnically
diverse societies the links between social capital and democracy can thus
be quite different from those seen in homogenous societies. While also
examining social trust and civic participation, Uslaner () is more
concerned with their determinants than with their effects. He finds that
thesamesetof factors influencestrustandparticipationinthetworegions,
despite their diverging political histories and different levels of civic
mindedness. Consequently, he concludes that the socio-psychological
mechanisms shaping civic attitudes have cross-regional validity.
What distinguishes the current study from the ones reviewed above is
that it is much broader in scope, covering not only trust and participa-
tion but all the aspects of civic culture. Second, it explores the durability
of civic culture in the two regions and in the transition countries in
particular. It does so by introducing three perspectives on civic culture
and by assessing to what extent the pattern of aggregate civic attitudes
found in the WVS and EVS data matches the expected outcomes of
these perspectives. Each of the perspectives assigns a different degree of
stability to civic culture and predicts a different pattern of attitudes. The
historical perspective locates the phenomenon in the distant past and
assumes it to be highly resilient to the political and economic conditions
prevailing at a given time in modern history. As noted before, it links
civic culture to the emergence of independent cities and middle classes
in Western Europe. Consequently, it expects civic culture to be stronger
in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe. The communist perspective
outlined in the previous section sees civic culture as a more elastic phe-
nomenon that is not as immune to political events as the historical
perspective claims. It argues that communism either destroyed civic
traditions or prevented civic values from developing in the countries
where it monopolized political life. The main fault line regarding civic
values is thus predicted to run along the former Iron Curtain. As noted




At first sight, it seems difficult to assess which of these two perspec-
tives has the most explanatory power since both seemingly predict
the same outcome (West-civic vs East-uncivic). On close inspection,
however, there are differences. The historical perspective assumes only
some regions in the West to have strong civic traditions (England,
France, Switzerland, the Low Countries, the British settler colonies). In
the more peripheral parts of this region and notably in countries with
a history of top-down modernization and (foreign) authoritarian
rule (Germany, Austria, Greece, southern Italy, Spain, Portugal) or
a legacy of semi-feudal relations exacerbated by religious divisions
(Ireland), civic culture is expected to be underdeveloped. Likewise it
predicts some variation among the former communist states, conside-
ring countries with a Standenstaat tradition ¢ such as Bohemia (the
Czech Republic) until the imposition of Austrian absolute rule in the
seventeenth century (Anderson ) ¢ and with a legacy of close eco-
nomic ties with the West (the Baltics) to have stronger civic institutions
than the isolated feudal societies further east. Thus, the historical pers-
pective would predict almost as much variation within each region, cer-
tainly within the West, as between East and West. The communist
perspective would not deny variation within the postcommunist world
as both the duration and nature of communist rule differed from
country to country. Yet it anticipates more variation between the post-
communist countries and the western market economies than within
these regions, and most definitely on the indicators of civic culture that
refer to citizen-state relations and attitudes towards strangers or ethnic
others.
In the third perspective civic culture is an even more flexible pheno-
menon, affected not only by long term regime policies but also and above
all by sudden and drastic socio-economic changes. This we might call
the transition perspective, which obviously has particular relevance for
the postcommunist states. In this view, the socio-economic restructuring
following the collapse of communism and the inability of the new
democratic regimes to enforce the law, offer moral guidance and gua-
rantee a basic level of economic livelihood gave rise to profound feelings
of existential insecurity and helplessness. Under these conditions people
developed a deep distrust of politicians and institutions and withdrew
into the small circles of family, friends and ethnic kin to retain some
measure of control over their lives. According to Snyder (, p. )
ethnic nationalism was the logical consequence of these processes: ‘‘It
[ethnic nationalism] predominates when institutions collapse, when
existing institutions are not fulfilling people’s basic needs, and when


satisfactory alternative structures are not readily available’’. Inglehart
and Welzel (, p. ) similarly stress that ‘‘Existential threats drive
people to seek safety in closely knit groups [...]. Under conditions of
insecurity, social capital is bonding rather than bridging’’. What pattern
of civic attitudes would the transition perspective predict? It would
anticipate that civic attitudes by and large correspond to economic
trends in the transition period. This means that levels of civic cons-
ciousness should be at their nadir at the same time as or soon after the
moment the economy starts to grow after several years of sharp decline.
For some countries this turning point happened before  (Poland,
the Baltic republics) while others had to wait for the end of the s for
this to occur (Ukraine, Russia). However in all postcommunist states
there should be a sharp decline in civic values after the fall of commu-
nism. Some, the transition perspective predicts, would already have
recovered from the mid- malaise by the close of the decade; others
will still show a declining trend. I will use World Bank data and the ,
 and waves of the WVS to explore the validity of the transition
perspective.
First I explore the explanatory power of the historical and commu-
nist perspectives. Table  presents the country aggregate values on the
 indicators of civic culture. To facilitate interpretation the countries
are ranked, with the postcommunist and western countries printed in
bold and normal style respectively. This allows the reader to determine
at a single glance whether Eastern countries cluster at either the top or
bottom end of the scale. The top end always signifies strong civic cul-
ture. As we can see, western countries, as a group, exhibit significantly
higher levels of civic consciousness than postcommunist societies on
nearly all indicators. Only on civic honesty and political discussions is the
difference in mean scores between the regions not significant or in the
other direction, respectively. These findings broadly support both
perspectives. The real test is the degree and nature of variation within
each of the regions.
To begin with the historical perspective, it can be seen that the
countries in the West that are expected to have strong civic traditions
indeed top the rankings on a good many indicators (particularly the
Nordics, the former British settler colonies and the Netherlands). In
contrast, versa, the ‘‘uncivic’’ countries in the West generally display
only average values on most indicators (Germany, Austria, Italy) with
some occasionally showing very low scores even in relation to the post-
communist countries (cf. Portugal on social trust and passive and active
participation; Malta on the two indicators of equality). Likewise, in the
 
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Civic attitudes in East and West (national aggregates)
Civic Engagement Political Equality Solidarity



















CZE . SWE . SWE . SWE . SWE . SWE .
SLV . USA . ICE . NL . IRE . ICE .
Nor . GB . DEN . DEN . ITA . ITA .
LIT . AUS . FIN . NOR . CRO . MAL .
Ger . CAN . USA . AUS . MAL . IRE .
EST . B . NL . EST . ICE . CRO .
MOL . FRA . EST . CAN . FIN . CZE .
Den . NOR . NOR . LUX . SLV . FIN .
Swe . SWI . CAN . USA . B . SLV .
BELA . N IRL . IRE . B . POL . POL .
MAC . IRE . N IRL . FRA . DEN . GRE .
Nl . SLV . SLO . GB . ROM . SLO .
CRO . NL . GRE . GER . GRE . DEN .
MONT . CZE . CZE . FIN . SLO . B .
Gre . DEN . LAT . SWI . CZE . N IRL .
Ice . AU . FRA . ICE . N IRL . NL .
UKR . ITA . SP . POR . NL . LUX .
ARM . LUX . GB . UKR . LUX . POR .
ALB . ICE . B . ARM . FRA . BUL 65.00
Swi . GER . HUN . ITA . POR . ROM .
LAT . GRE . AUS . SP . BUL . FRA .
SERB . FIN . LIT . IRE . AU . HUN .
POL . CRO . BELA . RUS . HUN . LAT .
RUS . MAL . LUX . N IRL . SP . GB .
Usa . SLO . SLV . AU . LAT . AU .
Au . SERB . CRO . LAT . GB . SP .
BUL . SP . ITA . MOL . GER . RUS .
Fin . LIT . GER . ROM . RUS . GER .
BOS . MAC . AU . SLO . UKR . UKR .
GEOR . MONT . SWI . GRE . LIT . EST .
SLO . POR . POR . SERB . EST . LIT .
Aus . POL . UKR . GEOR . BELA . BELA .
Lux . ALB . MONT . BELA . NOR . NOR .
Ita . BOS . SERB . CZE . AUS . AUS .
N irl . EST . BOS . MAC . CAN . CAN .
Fra . LAT . RUS . ALB . USA . USA .
Can . MOL . POL . AZE . SWI . SWI .
B . ARM . ROM . MONT . ARM . ARM .
Mal . HUN . BUL . HUN . MOL . MOL .
ROM . UKR . MAL . BUL . SERB . SERB .
Ire . GEOR . MOL . CRO . GEOR . GEOR .
HUN . RUS . MAC . SLV . MAC . MAC .
Sp . BUL . ALB . MAL . ALB . ALB .
AZE . ROM . ARM . POL . AZE . AZE .
Por . AZE . AZE . LIT . MONT . MONT .
Gb . BELA . GEOR . BOS . BOS . BOS .
West . . . . . .
East . . . . . .









































DEN . NL . POR . SWE . USA . USA .
SWE . SP . SWE . NL . SWE . SWE .
NOR . LAT . ICE . ICE . NL . CAN .
NL . LIT . CAN . DEN . ICE . GRE .
FIN . DEN . AUS . GER . CAN . NL .
BELA . BELA . NL . NOR . DEN . SLV .
ICE . SWE . SERB . FRA . FIN . B .
SWI . B . LUX . SP . ALB . FIN .
AUS . FRA . GER . CAN . B . LUX .
N IRL . FIN . SP . B . AU . DEN .
CAN . EST . LAT . SWI . LUX . IRE .
SP . RUS . NOR . LUX . GRE . SLO .
USA . CZE . SWI . CZE . IRE . ICE .
IRE . ICE . USA . FIN . MAC . CZE .
GER . UKR . DEN . USA . SLV . MAL .
AU . CRO . GEOR . GB . CZE . AU .
MONT . BUL . RUS . AUS . SLO . ITA .
ITA . GER . FRA . POR . N IRL . N IRL .
B . IRE . AU . AU . MONT . FRA .
GB . POR . IRE . GRE . MOL . CRO .
UKR . SLV . FIN . IRE . GER . LAT .
BUL . AU . GRE . ITA . ITA . EST .
LUX . N IRL . UKR . N IRL . CRO . GER .
LIT . GB . MAL . MAL . MAL . SP .
ARM . POL . GB . SLV . FRA . HUN .
ALB . GRE . SLO . SLO . GB . BELA .
CZE . ITA . ITA . LAT . BOS . BUL .
GRE . MAL . ALB . EST . BELA . ROM .
RUS . ROM . BELA . SERB . EST . POL .
EST . HUN . N IRL . CRO . SP . POR .
FRA . NOR . B . MAC . SERB . UKR .
HUN . SWI . MAC . BUL . UKR . LIT .
SLO . AUS . MOL . POL . HUN . RUS .
MAL . CAN . CZE . RUS . LAT . ALB .
AZE . USA . AZE . BELA . POL . MAC .
POL . MONT . MONT . BOS . RUS . MONT .
SERB . LUX . EST . ROM . POR . MOL .
GEOR . ARM . ROM . UKR . BUL . GB .
CRO . ALB . ARM . LIT . ROM . BOS .
LAT . SLO . CRO . MONT . LIT . SERB .
BOS . AZE . SLV . GEOR . NOR . NOR .
SLV . SERB . POL . MOL . SWI . SWI .
MOL . GEOR . LIT . ALB . AUS . AUS .
MAC . BOS . BUL . ARM . GEOR . GEOR .
ROM . MOL . BOS . AZE . ARM . ARM .
POR . MAC . HUN . HUN . AZE . AZE .
West . . . . . .
East . . . . . .
West-East .** . .** .** .** .**
Note: * p. <.; ** p. <.. Eastern countries are given in bold;Western countries in normal style.The values under
‘‘West’’ and ‘‘East’’ denote regional averages.The values in the last row denote the differences in means betweenWest and
East.
East the historically more ‘‘civic’’ states perform well across a range of
indicators (Czech Republic, Slovenia, Estonia and Latvia), whereas the
countries in the Balkans and the Caucasus generally trail the rankings.
Yet, there are also plenty of surprises. In the West, Britain and France
have remarkably low scores for ‘‘civic’’ nations on many indicators.
‘‘Uncivic’’ Spain has high values on civic honesty and on the two toler-
ance indicators. In the East ‘‘uncivic’’ Slovakia does very well across a
range of indicators, and ‘‘uncivic’’ Belarus has high scores on the two
trust items. Moreover, country scores can fluctuate widely across indi-
cators. Portugal for instance trails the ranking order on social trust but
tops the one on ethnic tolerance. Similarly, Greeks are surprisingly active
participants but have a dim view of the civic honesty of their compatriots.
These large cross-indicator differences confirm the observation above
that the internal consistency of civic culture is not very impressive.
More importantly and to the detriment of the historical perspective,
they also suggest that country specific factors have a substantial impact
on civic values.
The data of Table  provide an equally mixed pattern of support for
the communist perspective. On the one hand, the country rankings on
political activity, ethnic equality, social trust and ethnic tolerance are in line
with the expectation in a sense that the postcommunist countries almost
en bloc occupy the lower half of the scales. These are moreover precisely
the indicators on which the regions are expected to diverge most stron-
gly. The higher average scores of postcommunist countries on political
discussions is also anticipated as this particular indicator is likely to tap
the informal type of social capital considered to be so salient in the East.
On the other hand, the communist perspective cannot account for the
lack of regional differentiation on civic honesty. This indicator par
excellence should show a substantial difference as citizen-state relations
in the East are purportedly marked by mutual hostility and abuse.
Equally disturbing for the theory is the substantial variation among the
transition states on ethnic tolerance and the two association indicators.
The survey data discussed here thus do not express a clear preference
for either of the two perspectives. Both perspectives are supported in a
more or less equal measure. In order to fully appreciate the durability of
civic culture, however, the validity of the transition perspective needs to
be examined. I assessed civic trends in those transition states that par-
ticipated in all three WVS waves (-; -; -)
since the demise of communism. Figure  shows the economic perfor-
mance of these states during the s measured in GNP per capita.
Except for Poland and Slovenia whose economies started to recover at a


      
Trends in GNP per capita in selected transition states during the s
very early stage, the other six states experienced a sharp decline in the
early s and had to wait for the turning point until -. Towards
the end of the millennium their economies had not yet reached their
pre-independence levels. Consequently, the transition perspective
would expect civic attitudes in these states to fall sharply between 
and , to reach their lowest point in the mid-s and to show a
modest recovery thereafter. In Slovenia and Poland levels of civic atti-
tudes should be higher at the close of the decade than at the beginning.
Table  presents the developments in civic values on seven indicators
 

       
Trends in civic attitudes in eight transition states
Political discussions
(% frequently and occasionally)
Political activity
(% have signed a petition)
 - -  - -
Bulgaria . . . . . .
Estonia . . . . . .
Latvia . . . . . .
Lithuania . . . . . .
Poland . . . . . .
Slovenia . . . . . .
Belarus . . . . . .
Russia . . . . . .
Gender equality
(% disagreeing with statement
‘‘priority men when jobs
are scarce’’)
Ethnic equality
(% disagreeing with statement
‘‘priority own nation when jobs
are scarce’’)
 - -  - -
Bulgaria . . . . . .
Estonia . . . . . .
Latvia . . . . . .
Lithuania . . . . . .
Poland . . . . . .
Slovenia . . . . . .
Belarus . . . . . .
Russia . . . . . .
Ethnic tolerance
(% not expressing reservations
about immigrants as neighbours)
Sexual tolerance
(% not expressing reservations
about homosexuals
as neighbours)
 - -  - -
Bulgaria . . . . . .
Estonia . . . . . .
Latvia . . . . . .
Lithuania . . . . . .
Poland - . . - . .
Slovenia . . . . . .
Belarus . . . . . .
Russia . . . . . .
Social trust
(% most people can be trusted)
 - -
Bulgaria . . .
Estonia . . .
Latvia . . .
Lithuania . . .
Poland . . .
Slovenia . . .
Belarus . . .
Russia . . .
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of civic culture (). It can be seen that the transition perspective works
reasonably well for social trust, political discussions and political activity.
The majority of countries display the expected mid s dip on these
indicators, and in only three countries, two of them being Poland and
Slovenia on political activity, are levels of civic values higher at the end
of the decade than at the beginning. Nonetheless there are also unex-
pected trends. Latvian levels of social trust first rise and then decline. In
Poland civic values are stronger at the beginning of the s than at the
end (with the exception of political activity). What is also slightly diffi-
cult for the transition perspective to digest is that the fluctuations are
fairly small. Levels of social trust remain low and the frequency of dis-
cussing politics remains high throughout the s. Only the trends on
political activity almost perfectly match the predicted pattern. Thus, the
socio-economic transformation seems not to have impacted on civic
values to the extent that the transition perspective expected.
More damaging for the perspective is that the trends on the other
indicators do not at all follow the anticipated pattern. Developments on
ethnic equality and ethnic tolerance go in all kinds of directions. What can
be observed is the persistent consensus across the board (Estonia
excepting) that it is legitimate to give priority to co-nationals over
immigrants when jobs are scarce (i.e. low levels of ethnic equality). Truly
spectacular, however, are the steep upward trends on gender equality and
sexual tolerance. During the s people in the eight transition states,
and most notably in the Baltics, have become much more accepting of
homosexuals and have embraced the idea of gender equality in ever
higher numbers, contrary to the prediction of the transition perspective.
Possibly, these trends are not so much linked to socio-economic res-
tructuring but to the change from a secluded communist society to an
open democratic one absorbing cultural influences from the West.
Reviewing the empirical evidence for the three perspectives, the
rather unsatisfactory conclusion has to be drawn that there is some
measure of support for all three of them. In other words, civic culture is
a function of both slowly evolving historical processes and short and
medium term political and economic developments. The support for
each of the three perspectives, however, varies from country to country,
which suggests that country specific factors have a strong bearing on
civic culture as well. It also varies from indicator to indicator. The his-
() The table does not present the two indi-
cators on solidarity the other trust indicator on
trust (civic honesty) because these items were
not asked in the - wave. Passive and
active participation are not included because




torical perspective is endorsed by political activity, social trust and pas-
sive and active participation as the allegedly strong civic nations top the
rankings on these indicators and the ‘‘uncivic’’ nations are at the bottom
end. The communist perspective is supported by those indicators on
which the difference between the former communist world and the West
is the largest, i.e. ethnic equality, sexual tolerance, and, once again, politi-
cal activity. The transition perspective relies above all on political acti-
vity (yet again!) and to a lesser extent on social trust and discussing poli-
tics, as the trends on these indicators are as anticipated. Paradoxically,
the variation on one single indicator (political activity) matches the pre-
dicted outcome of all three perspectives simultaneously. This illustrates
as no other that all three perspectives seem to have a more or less equal
measure of explanatory power. In a broader sense, theories that assume
cultural dispositions to react strongly to recent events are corroborated
by the drastically changing attitudes on gender equality and sexual tole-
rance in the transition states. The variation between indicators, more-
over, underlines the observation above that civic culture is a highly
heterogeneous concept as it includes notions that are highly responsive
to recent events and notions which seem to have a fair amount of dura-
bility. Interestingly, though focussing on secular-rational values and
self-expression values, Inglehart and Welzel () arrive at remarkably
similar conclusions regarding the tenacity of culture and the main fac-
tors impinging on it. They find that age old religious traditions, national
idiosyncrasies, the legacy of communism and more recent socio-
economic developments all exert a powerful influence on a society’s
value system. The influence of these factors however differs from value
complex to value complex. Cultural legacies have a relatively greater
impact on secular-rational values, while the dynamic process of moder-
nization can best account for changes in self-expression values.
Conclusion
Using WVS and EVS data to assess patterns of civic attitudes in East
and West, this article has demonstrated that civic culture is not as
coherent a set of attitudes as some cultural theorists, Putnam first of all,
claim it is. At the individual level, the attitudes commonly associated
with civic culture do not cluster to a sufficient degree for them to be
clearly distinguished from other dispositions. Moreover, there are geo-
graphical variations in the nature of civic culture as the correlations
between civic attitudes are weaker in the East than in the West. When

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tested empirically, the theoretical notion of civic culture thus not only
constitutes a rather arbitrary collection of attitudes in the individual’s
mind, it also assumes different characteristics across regions. Civic
values cluster slightly better at the societal level, but they do not form a
convincing clearly demarcated one-dimensional syndrome at that level
either. Even the more focused notion of social capital appears to be more
a bi- than mono-dimensional phenomenon at the macro level, which is
bad news for theorists who contend that it has the properties of a public
good.
This study has also found civic culture to be significantly weaker in
the former communist states across a wide range of indicators. The
question it sought to answer is whether this difference is rooted in the
pre-modern past or whether it is the consequence of more recent deve-
lopments. In other words, how persistent are civic values and how
insensitive are they to political and economic events? As it turns out, the
data examined in this paper only partially support the notion that civic
culture is a durable phenomenon. If it had been as durable as claimed,
the pattern of civic attitudes across western countries and transition
states would have closely matched the one expected by the historical
perspective, which traces the roots of civic culture back to medieval
times. Instead, the historical perspective correctly predicts the variation
on only some attitudes in only some countries. The patterns on other
attitudes are more in line with the expected outcomes of the legacy of
communism perspective and the post-communist transition theory.
These perspectives may be said to rival with the historical perspective in
that they assign a higher degree of pliability to civic culture. Further-
more, the trends on two attitudes, gender equality and sexual tolerance,
show such a spectacular and unexpected increase throughout the s
in several transition societies, that other factors not explored in this
study are likely to have impacted on civic values as well. Yet, it must be
borne in mind that this study, by relying on survey data that cover a time
span of no more than ten years, could only partially explore the persis-
tence of civic attitudes. Examining trends of civic culture across much
larger time intervals, in a manner that Putnam has done for Italy, would
have produced stronger conclusions.
Summing up, civic culture seems not to be the coherent and durable
phenomenon that some theorists assume it to be. This has two implica-
tions. First, the continued use of the term ‘‘civic culture’’ should be
questioned. Is seems wiser to rearrange the conceptual labelling and
grouping of civic values to arrive at syndromes which include more
restricted but more coherent sets of values. Even the more parsimonious
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notion of social capital and the elements it is said to include in this sense
needs revision. An interesting direction of future research, therefore,
would be to identify these syndromes, to examine their durability across
a substantial period of time, and to assess the extent to which democracy
and socio-economic development depend on them. Second, because
civic values would appear to be at least as much the result of recent
economic and political processes as the outcome of path dependencies,
‘‘uncivic’’ regions are not doomed to be burdened with authoritarian
cultures and atomized societies forever. This is positive news for all
those who believe that civic values are a crucial condition for democracy.
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
A Gabriel A. and Sidney V, 1963.
The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and
Democracy in Five Nations (Boston, Little,
Brown and Company).
A Perry, . Lineages of the Abso-
lute State (London, NLB).
B Gabriel and Eric M. U, 2003.
‘‘Introduction’’, in B Gabriel and
Eric M. U, eds, Social Capital and
the Transition to Democracy (London, Rout-
ledge, pp. -).
B M Jr, . Social Origins of
Dictatorship and Democracy. Lord and Pea-
sant in the Making of the Modern World
(Harmondsworth, Penguin Books).
B Marc, . Feudal Society (London,
Routledge & Kegan Paul).
B Pierre, . ‘‘Forms of Capital’’, in
R J., ed, Handbook of Theory and
Research in the Sociology of Education (New
York, Greenwood Press).
B John and Wendy R, .
‘‘Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes
and Consequences of Social Capital’’, Ame-
rican Journal of Political Science,  (),
pp. -.
C Daniel, . ‘‘Causes and Conse-
quences of Backwardness’’, in C
Daniel, ed, The Origins of Backwardness in
Eastern Europe. Economics and Politics from
the Middle Ages until the Early Twentieth
Century (Berkeley, University of California
Press, pp. -).
D S B Javier, . ‘‘Doing
Democracy Up Close: Culture, Power and
Communication in Community Building’’,
Journal of Planning Education and Research,
, pp. -.
D Kathleen M. and Brian D. S,
2002. ‘‘Social Capital, Ethnicity and Sup-
port for Democracy in the Post-Communist
States’’, Europe-Asia Studies,  (),
pp. -.
G William A., . Liberal Purposes.
Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal
State (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press).
G Andy, John P and Ricardo
S, . ‘‘Education, Equality and
Social Cohesion. A Distributional
Approach’’, Compare,  (), pp. -.
G Andy, John P and Jan Germen
J, 2006. Education, Equality and
Social Cohesion. A Comparative Analysis
(London, Palgrave Macmillan).
I Ronald and Christian W,
. Modernization, Cultural Change and
Democracy (Cambridge, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press).
J Robert W. and Ross A. M,
. ‘‘A Renaissance of Political Culture?’’,
American Journal of Political Science,  (),
pp. -.
—, . Before Norms. Institutions and Civic
Culture (Ann Arbor, The University of
Michigan Press).
K Hans, . The Idea of Nationalism. A
Study in Its Origins and Background (New
York, Macmillan).
—, . ‘‘Western and Eastern Nationalism’’,
in H John and Anthony D.
S, eds, Nationalism (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, pp. -).
K Taras, . ‘‘The Myth of the Civic
State: A Critical Survey of Hans Kohn’s


Framework for Understanding Nationa-
lism’’, Ethnic and Racial studies,  (),
pp. -.
K Will, a. ‘‘Misunderstanding
nationalism’’, in B Ronald, ed, Theo-
rizing Nationalism (Albany: State Univer-
sity of New York Press, pp. -).
—, b. ‘‘Education for Citizenship’’, in
H J. Mark and Terence H.
ML, eds, Education in Morality
(London, Routledge, pp. -).
—, . Contemporary Political Philosophy
(Oxford, Oxford University Press).
M Petr, . ‘‘Social Capital. Problems
of its Conceptualization and Measurement
in Transforming Societies’’ (paper presen-
ted at the OECD-ONS Conference on
Social Capital Measurement, London, Sep-
tember -, ).
N, Kenneth, . ‘‘Trust, Social
Capital, Civil Society, and Democracy’’,
International Political Science Review,  (),
pp. -.
N Kai, . ‘‘Cultural nationalism,
neither ethnic nor civic’’, in B Ronald,
ed, Theorizing Nationalism (Albany: State
University of New York Press, pp. -).
N Pippa, . ‘‘Making Democracies
Work. Social Capital and Civic Engagement
in  Societies’’ (paper presented at the
Midwest Political Science Association th
Annual Meeting, April , , Palmer
House Hilton, Chicago).
O Mancur, . ‘‘Dictatorship, Demo-
cracy and Development’’, American Political
Science Review,  (), pp. -.
P A. and P. L, . ‘‘The
Downside of Social Capital’’, The American
Prospect, , pp. -.
P Robert D., . Making Democracy
Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
—, . Bowling Alone. The Collapse and
Revival of American Community (New York,
Simon and Schuster).
P Robert D. and Kristin A. G, .
‘‘Introduction’’, in P Robert D., ed,
Democracies in Flux. The Evolution of Social
Capital in Contemporary Society (Oxford,
Oxford University Press, pp. -).
R Martin, Christian H, Thomas
N and Claire W, .
Social Capital in Transition (working paper
No. , European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development).
RRichard, William M and Christian
H, . ‘‘Social Capital in Civic
and Stressful Societies’’, Studies in Compa-
rative International Development,  (),
pp. -.
S George, . Nations, Identity,
Power (London, Hurst & Company).
S Stephan, . ‘‘Challenging the
civic/ethnic and West/East dichotomies in
the study of nationalism’’, Comparative
Political Studies,  (), pp. -.
S Anthony, . The Ethnic Origins of
Nations (Oxford: Blackwell).
S Aleksander, . ‘‘From Opposition
to Atomization’’, Journal of Democracy, 
(), pp. -.
S Jack, . ‘‘Nationalism and the
Crisis of the Post-Soviet State’’, in B
Michael E., ed, Ethnic Conflict and Interna-
tional Security (Princeton NJ, Princeton
University Press, pp. -).
S Nigel, . ‘‘Social Capital and its
Uses’’, European Journal of Sociology, 
(), pp. -.
U Eric M., 2003. ‘‘Trust and Civic
Engagement in East and West’’, in B
Gabriel and Eric M. U, eds, Social
Capital and the Transition to Democracy
(London, Routledge, pp. -).
V D Jan W., . ‘‘The Proof of the
Pudding. Social Capital, Democracy and
Citizenship’’ (paper presented at the
EURESCO Conference Social Capital:
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Exeter, UK,
-September ).
 

